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DON'T TAKE IT PERSONALLY-LIMITED LIABILITY FOR
ATTORNEY SHAREHOLDERS UNDER FLORIDA'S
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION ACT
JAMES M. GRIPPANDO*
Multimillion dollar lawsuits and rising malpractice insurance
premiums have heightened professional interest in limited lia-
bility. In this Article, James M. Grippando examines limited lia-
bility as it applies to Florida professional service corporations
with attorney shareholders. Grippando provides a detailed anal-
ysis of the Florida Professional Service Corporation Act and the
court decisions construing it. He concludes that the Act as writ-
ten provides limited liability for professionals in general and
discusses public policy considerations courts have weighed and
should weigh in determining whether attorneys in particular
should enjoy limited liability.
T HE FLORIDA Professional Service Corporation Act (herein-
after "Act" or "Florida Act")' created an exception to the
traditional Florida rule prohibiting corporations from being li-
censed to practice a profession.2 The Act recognized a new form of
business entity, the professional service corporation (PSC)2 By es-
tablishing a PSC in accordance with the Act, professionals,4 who
* Associate Attorney, Steel, Hector & Davis, Miami, Florida. B.A., 1980; J.D., 1982, Uni-
versity of Florida. Judicial Clerk for Hon. Thomas A. Clark, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
l1th Circuit, 1983-84.
1. FLA. STAT. § 621.01 (1985). The Act became effective in September 1, 1961. See Ch.
61-64, § 16, 1961 Fla. Laws 93.
2. See In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 1961) ("Traditionally, the so-called
learned professions have not been permitted to practice as corporate entities"). The leading
case establishing this rule is In re Co-op Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910), in which
the court refused to permit lawyers to incorporate under the general business corporation
statute primarily because the court feared that the integrity of the bar would be under-
mined should corporations performing legal services be owned or controlled by nonlawyers.
The rule still retains its vitality. See, e.g., Szteinbaum v. Kaes Inversiones y Valores, 476 So.
2d 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (corporation's filing of complaint not signed by an attorney con-
stituted the unauthorized practice of law); Angelini v. Mobile Home Village, Inc., 310 So. 2d
776 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (corporate official may not sign a pleading for corporation as a
corporation is prohibited from practice of law).
3. Although this Article uses the acronym "PSC," it should be noted that the Act pro-
hibits the use of any word or abbreviation other than "professional association," "P.A." or
"chartered" in the firm name to indicate incorportation under the Act. FLA. STAT. § 621.12
(1985).
4. For a Florida case demonstrating the potentially broad range of persons who might be
considered "professionals," see Parker v. Panama City, 151 So. 2d 469, 472 (Fla. 1st DCA
1963).
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had traditionally practiced as partnerships, could associate in an
entity with many of the characteristics of a corporation.'
Initially, the significance of these corporate attributes was
largely tax related. By imbuing PSCs with certain corporate char-
acteristics, Florida, like many other states, attempted to make pro-
fessionals eligible for federal income tax benefits that, despite the
lobbying efforts of various professional groups, only business cor-
porations had enjoyed.6 Thus, to create parity between profession-
als and nonprofessionals for purposes of federal income tax treat-
ment, the Florida Act allowed professionals to acquire certain
attributes of "corporateness," as defined by case law and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service.7 Perhaps the most important of these attrib-
utes was limited liability.8
Significant revisions to the Federal Income Tax Code in 19819
and 198210 substantially eliminated the major differences in tax
benefits available to partnerships and corporations." Conse-
quently, while tax benefits fueled the advent of PSCs, the future
will be determined by the nontax advantage12 that loomed so im-
portant in determining "corporateness" for tax purposes-limited
liability.13 Rising malpractice insurance premiums"' and recent
5. Buchmann & Bearden, The Professional Service Corporation-A New Business En-
tity, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1961).
6. The Florida Supreme Court has been open and frank about the tax motivations be-
hind the Act. See, e.g., Street v. Sugerman, 202 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1967).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 31-45.
8. See Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97, 104 (5th Cir. 1969). By no means, however,
was limited liability the sina qua non of "corporateness." See, e.g., Foreman v. United
States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964) (corporate tax benefits held applicable to medical
association even though the association did not and could not, under then existing law, meet
the criteria of limited liability).
9. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
10. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
11. See generally Bowman, The Professional Corporation- Has the Death Knell Been
Sounded?, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 515 (1983).
12. See Moore, Incorporated Lawyers Not Eager to Liquidate, Legal Times, Apr. 11,
1983 at 1, col. 1 ("Despite [tax law] changes ... some tax attorneys maintain there are
substantial nontax reasons for remaining incorporated, including limited personal liability
and increased control over pension and investment decisions"); cf. Moore, IRS Expected to
Render Restrictive Interpretation of New Statute on P.C.s, Legal Times, Nov. 29, 1982 at 1,
col. 3 ("tax lawyers remain convinced that partnerships of professional corporations may
survive the government's onslaught [because] ... there are nontax reasons for incorporation,
such as limited liability against malpractice suits").
13. Commentators generally regard limited liability as the most important nontax ad-
vantage of the PSC. E.g., G. RAY, INCORPORATING THE PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 36 (3d ed.
1982); Rotgin, The Professional Corporation for Lawyers, 52 N.Y. ST. B.J. 634 (1980). See
Prof. Corp. Handbook (CCH) 155 (1971). Other significant nontax advantages include cen-
tralized management, continuity of life and transferability of shares. Ray, supra; S. RIEMER,
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multimillion dollar lawsuits against partnerships and innocent
partners for individual partners' misdeeds15 have heightened pro-
fessional interest in limited liability.
As applied to professionals, the concept of limited liability has
two distinct components: (1) liability for negligence and miscon-
duct while rendering professional services, and (2) liability for or-
dinary business debts of the PSC and its shareholders, including
ordinary tort and contractual liability."6 Under general partnership
SERVICING THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, A COMPLETE MANUAL AND GUIDE 2-3 (1976). Ad-
ditionally, for many professionals in PSCs, the need to file estimated tax returns is elimi-
nated, and as a general matter, professionals in PSCs become more aware of the business
aspects of practice. Id.
14. Concern over rising legal malpractice premiums and the availability of legal malprac-
tice insurance has recently reached crisis proportions. See McCabe, Lawyer Liabil-
ity-When the Practitioner Becomes the Target, 22 TRIAL 45 (July 1986) (claims against
lawyers have increased over the past five years at an average rate of almost 20% per year);
Galante, Insurance Costs Soar: Is There Any Way Out?, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 10, 1986, at 1, col.
1 ("the near future for legal malpractice insurance does not appear bright"); Press & Car-
roll, Look Who's Getting Sued Now, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 26, 1985, at 58 (legal malpractice
cases have tripled since 1980 and average settlements soared from $3,000 in 1982 to $45,000
in 1985; consequently, insurance carriers increased their rates 300 to 550% from 1984 to
1985 and many stopped writing policies altogether so that nearly one fourth of lawyers who
wanted insurance could not get it); Keppel, L.A. Legal Community Scrambling To Find A
Lead Insurer, L.A. Times, Aug. 19, 1985, pt. 4 at 1, col. 1 (reporting that legal malpractice
insurer for the 6,500-member Los Angeles Bar was withdrawing); Galante, Legal Insurance
Crisis, Malpractice Rates Zoom, Nat'l L.J., June 3, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (citing examples of rate
increases and policy cancellations and exploring reasons therefor). Although the crisis is a
recent phenomenon, cost and availability of legal malpractice insurance has been a persis-
tent problem at least for the last decade. See, e.g., Meyer, Top Insurer of Lawyers To Drop
Out in Maryland, Wash. Post, Feb. 2, 1977, at D3, col. 1 (reporting that largest single sup-
plier of legal malpractice insurance plans to issue no more policies); Footlick & Gram, Suing
Your Lawyer, NEWSWEEK, June 23, 1975, at 93 (reporting 50% increase in number of legal
malpractice actions filed in last five years and that one of nation's largest carriers increased
its rates 50% in last year). Private firms are not the only entities affected by the crisis. See
Danner, Businesses Lack Resources For Pro Bono Work, Legal Times, June 28, 1982, at 2,
col. 2 (citing need for expensive malpractice insurance as one obstacle to pro bono work by
corporations).
15. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Jacoby (Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley), No. 86-1894 (S.D.
Fla., 1986) ($250 million suit against general counsel of insolvent savings and loan associa-
tion for alleged participation in wrongful acts of officers and directors, negligent representa-
tion in loan transactions and violation of duty to client arising out of numerous conflicts of
interest); American Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Arky, No. 86-01305-Ca-23 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1986) ($68
million suit by client/investor against law firm and its managing partner's estate for mal-
practice and breach of fiduciary duty arising out of managing partner's nondisclosure of
various conflicts of interest). See also In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litigation, 110 F.R.D.
545 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (securities fraud, RICO, common law fraud and negligence action
against individual partners of accounting partnership seeking $115 million before trebling
based on Fort Lauderdale partner's wrongful acts).
16. See Paas, Professional Corporations and Attorney-Shareholders: The Decline of
Limited Liability, 11 J. OF CORP. L. 371, 374 (1986); Rotgin, supra note 13, at 634.
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principles, liability is unlimited: all partners are jointly and sever-
ally liable for wrongful acts of a partner committed while acting
within the scope of the partnership's business.17
The Florida Professional Corporation Act appears to alter these
principles with respect to both malpractice liability and liability
for ordinary business debts. The Act clearly retains liability for the
shareholder who breaches a duty to a client and any other share-
holder who was supervising him, 8 but the Act apparently shields
innocent shareholders from vicarious liability for their fellow
shareholders' malpractice by providing that liability for one's own
acts or those by persons under one's supervision and control shall
be the shareholder's "only" personal liability. 9 As to liability for
ordinary business debts, the Act originally was silent 20 but has
since been amended to provide that the personal liability of a PSC
shareholder-employee "shall be no greater in any aspect than that
of a shareholder-employee of a corporation organized under [the
Florida General Corporation Act]."12 Thus, the plain, unambiguous
language of the statute provides for limited liability.
Unfortunately, the clarity of Florida's statute may not be the
end of the matter. Because of the judiciary's plenary control over
attorneys and the practice of law, courts from other jurisdictions
have taken great latitude in defining the parameters of attorney
shareholder liability despite the language of applicable statutes.2 2
Although no Florida court has yet ignored the Act's plain language,
the Florida Supreme Court has made it clear that the practice of
law through PSCs is subject to the approval and conditions im-
posed by the court.23
17. FLA. STAT. §§ 620.62, .625, .63 (1985). See Uniform Partnership Act §§ 13, 15. See
generally Annotation, Vicarious Liability of Attorney for Torts of Partnership Law Firm,
70 A.L.R. 3(D) 1298. The fact that a partner's wrongful acts are fraudulent or even criminal
does not abrogate joint and several liability. See Elligett, Law Firm Liability for Misappro-
priation, 60 FLA. B.J. 19 (Nov. 1986). For an economic justification for unlimited liability of
partners, see Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J. L. & EcON. 327,
336-37 (1983) (arguing that professional partnerships "contract for unlimited liability" to
assure customer compensation for losses and bond the quality of partner services).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 53-56.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 57-68.
20. See Buchmann & Bearden, supra note 5, at 12 ("Insofar as personal liability to gen-
eral creditors, or for any claims arising against the corporation other than as a direct result
of misconduct or negligence not connected with the rendition of professional services is con-
cerned, the personal liability of the corporation and of the individuals involved would follow
common law principles.").
21. Ch. 67-590, 1967 Fla. Laws 1725, § 2.
22. See infra notes 107-173 and accompanying text.
23. See In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 24 554 (Fla. 1961).
LIMITED LIABILITY
In this Article the author examines the corporate concept of lim-
ited liability as it applies to Florida PSCs with attorney sharehold-
ers. The author first provides a brief historical analysis of the origi-
nal legislative purpose behind the enactment of professional
service corporation statutes. Then he reviews the Florida Act and
the state and the federal case law construing the Act. The author
next analyzes cases from jurisdictions outside Florida that have at-
tempted to redefine liability limits for professional legal corpora-
tions, and assesses the impact these cases may have on Florida law.
Finally, the author identifies and discusses important policy issues
Florida courts should consider when construing the Act.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROFESSIONAL SERVICE
CORPORATION
As the Florida Supreme Court has recognized, PSCs "evolved
and were designed primarily for the purpose of allowing various
professions, not previously privileged to incorporate, to form orga-
nizations that would legitimately qualify for certain tax or retire-
ment advantages available to corporations." '24 Historically, signifi-
cant tax benefits available to taxpayers who qualified as employees
were unavailable to self-employed individuals. These benefits in-
cluded qualified pension and profit-sharing plans under which em-
ployer contributions were deductible,25 interest earned on plan in-
vestments was nontaxable,2 6 and deferring income from years of
high earnings to retirement years.27
For years the American Medical and Bar Associations urged
members to support legislation that would provide to the self-em-
ployed the same retirement benefits enjoyed by corporate employ-
ees. 8 The result of these efforts, the "Self-Employed Individuals
Retirement Bill"29 (the "Keogh" bill), was immediately criticized
as "a heavily watered-down version of the original bill introduced
24. Street v. Sugerman, 202 So. 2d 749, 751 (Fla. 1967). See In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d
at 555 ("The current state legislation typified by Chapter 61-64 [the Florida Act], is an
outgrowth of various regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service of the United
States Treasury Department."). See also Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97, 106 (5th
Cir. 1969).
25. I.R.C. § 404(a) (1954).
26. Id. § 501(a).
27. See Note, Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 HARV. L. REV. 776, 777
(1962).
28. Buchmann & Bearden, supra note 5, at 3 n.17.
29. Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-792, 76 Stat.
809 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2039 (1962)).
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in Congress" that failed to put self-employed individuals on equal
footing with corporate employees."
Because the tax code continued to confer significant tax benefits
on "corporations" that were not extended to other entities, the
Code's definition of "corporation," and the courts' and Internal
Revenue Service's (IRS) interpretation of that definition, became
significant. The Code defines "corporation" to include "associa-
tions."3 In Morrissey v. Commissioner,32 the United States Su-
preme Court defined an "association" as a business organization
lacking a corporate charter but possessing major corporate attrib-
utes, such as continuity of life, centralized management, free trans-
ferability of interests of ownership, and limited liability.3 Lower
courts soon after established that a preponderance of these attrib-
utes was sufficient to qualify a business organization as an
"association." 4
In the 1950s, considerable controversy developed as to whether
the existence of these characteristics was to be determined as a
matter of state or federal law. Resolution of this issue was crucial
for professionals because state law generally forbade professionals
from incorporating. 5 In a landmark decision, United States v.
Kintner,36 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
federal law governs the characterization of an organization for tax
purposes.3" The Kintner court held that, although state law pro-
hibited professionals from incorporating, a group of Montana phy-
sicians qualified for corporate tax benefits.3" The basis for the
court's holding was the physicians' agreement that no member
would be liable for another's professional misconduct, and that
management would continue in business despite the death or with-
drawal of any member.
The victory for professionals in Kintner was cut short in 1960,
when the IRS issued opposing regulations. These "Kintner regula-
tions" adopted the Morrissey four part "corporate resemblance"
30. See Report of Comm. on Pension and Profit Sharing Trusts, ABA SECT. OF REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. L. PROC. 135-54 (1963).
31. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1954).
32. 296 U.S. 344, 352 (1935).
33. RIEMER, supra note 13, at 2-3.
34. See, e.g., Bert v. Helvering, 92 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
35. See In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961) ("Traditionally, the so-called
learned professionals have not been permitted to practice as corporate entities.").
36. 216 F.2d 418, 424 (9th Cir. 1954).
37. Accord Gait v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex 1959).
38. Kintner, 216 F.2d at 428.
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test, but established that the character of the corporate attributes
identified in Morrissey were to be evaluated under state law.39
Thus, the "Kintner regulations" placed control over the federal tax
status of professional organizations in the state legislatures.
The state legislatures responded quickly to the Kintner regula-
tions by enacting professional service corporation statutes. In 1961,
the Florida Professional Service Corporation Act enabled profes-
sionals to practice as corporations or as associations with corporate
characteristics.40
The IRS responded to the state law developments by enacting
regulations in 1965 that "rather incredibly, isolate[d] professional
groups and state[d] in no uncertain terms that they cannot be cor-
porations for federal tax purposes." '41 Courts criticized the new
standard as arbitrary and discriminatory "legislation" by an ad-
ministrative agency,42 and the regulations were invalidated in every
federal circuit in which they were litigated.43 The IRS acquiesced
in a Technical Information Release and conceded that groups of
professionals organized under most states' professional corporation
laws generally would be treated as corporations for tax purposes. 4
Eventually, all fifty states enacted statutes authorizing the creation
of PSCs or professional associations.45
II. THE FLORIDA PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION ACT
Compared to the professional service corporation statutes of
many states, 6 the Florida Act is fairly detailed with respect to
shareholder liability. Section 621.07 of the Act currently provides
as follows:
Nothing contained in this act shall be interpreted to abolish,
repeal, modify, restrict, or limit the law now in effect in this state
applicable to the professional relationship and liabilities between
the person furnishing the professional services and the person re-
39. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (1960).
40. Ch. 61-64, 1961 Fla. Laws 93.
41. Kurzner, 413 F.2d at 106 (discussing Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1965)).
42. See, e.g., id. at 106.
43. See Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969); O'Neill v. United States,
410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
44. Tech. Info. Rel. 1019, superseded by Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1 C.B. 278.
45. For a general listing of state statutes, see MODEL BusiNmss CoRP. Acr ANNOTATED at
1928 (1984).
46. For a survey of the PSC statutes of all states, see Note, Shareholder Liability in
Professional Legal Corporation: A Survey of the States, 47 U. Pirr. L. REV. 817 (1986).
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ceiving such professional service and to the standards for profes-
sional conduct; provided, however, that any officer, agent, or em-
ployee of a corporation organized under this act shall be
personally liable and accountable only for negligent or wrongful
acts or misconduct committed by him, or by any person under his
direct supervision and control, while rendering professional ser-
vice on behalf of the corporation to the person for whom such
professional services were being rendered; and provided further
that the personal liability of shareholders of a corporation organ-
ized under this act, in their capacity as shareholders of such cor-
poration, shall be no greater in any aspect than that of a share-
holder-employee of a corporation organized under [the Florida
General Corporation Act]. The corporation shall be liable up to
the full value of its property for any negligent or wrongful acts or
misconduct committed by any of its officers, agents, or employees
while they are engaged on behalf of the corporation in the render-
ing of professional services.4 7
No reported Florida decision has yet construed section 621.07 in
a suit against a shareholder for breach of a duty to a client or for
an ordinary business debt. This lack of definitive judicial prece-
dent, however, does not create uncertainty as to shareholder liabil-
ity. First, the statute is unambiguous and, under general rules of
statutory construction, the plain and ordinary meaning of the stat-
utory language defines the scope of liability. Second, several cases
have discussed the concept of limited liability in contexts other
than suits against shareholders, and these cases consistently indi-
cate that the Act provides limited liability.
A. Statutory Construction
Section 621.07 has two basic components. First, it contains a
general "savings clause" that purports to preserve the law gov-
erning liabilities of professionals to their clients. Second, it con-
tains detailed limited liability provisions that create numerous ex-
ceptions to the general savings clause. Together, the savings clause
and detailed liability provisions set forth an unambiguous schedule
of limited liability.
47. FLA. STAT. § 621.07 (1985).
LIMITED LIABILITY
1. The General "Savings Clause"
Section 621.07 begins rather ominously, providing in its first sen-
tence that "[n]othing contained in this act shall be interpreted to
abolish, repeal, modify, restrict, or limit the law now in effect in
this state applicable to the professional relationship and liabilities
between the person furnishing the professional services and the
person receiving such professional service. '' 48 In isolation, a savings
clause such as this could reasonably be read to preserve general
partnership principles of unlimited liability, as unlimited liability
was part of the law applicable to professional relationships when
the Act was enacted.49 Courts have reached this very conclusion in
at least three states with professional corporation statutes that do
not detail the extent of shareholder liability but rather address lia-
bility only in a savings clause.50
A statute, however, must be read as a whole; a court may not
focus on language in isolation so as to render a clear statute ambig-
uous. 1 Unlike statutes in other states that define shareholder lia-
bility solely through a savings clause,52 the Florida Act precisely
defines the scope of shareholder liability elsewhere. Thus, if these
detailed provisions are clear, the general savings clause should not
render section 621.07 ambiguous, and the detailed limited liability
provisions should control.
48. Id.
49. One commentator has made this argument with respect to the Pennsylvania statute,
which contains a savings clause similar to that in the Florida Act. See Note, supra note 46,
at 836.
50. See First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674 (1983); South
High Dev., Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 1, 445 N.E.2d 1106 (1983);
Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, 22 N.C. App. 544, 207 S.E.2d 267, rev'd on other grounds, 286
N.C. 24, 209 S.E.2d 795 (1974).
51. United States v. Alexander, 602 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th Cir. 1979) (particular clause or
phrase of statute cannot be read in isolation but must be construed as part of statutory
whole); Topeka Inn Management v. Pate, 414 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (entire stat-
ute, not just isolated phrases and words, must be considered in determining legislative in-
tent and effect must be given to every part of the statute as a whole).
52. See Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-2015 (1980); California: CAL. CORP. CODE §
13410 (West 1977); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 14-7-7 (1982); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §
17-2715 (Supp. 1986); Maryland: MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 5-120(b) (1985);
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55B-9 (1982); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1785.04
(Page 1986); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 812 (West Supp. 1985); Tennessee:
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-3-407 (1984); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-11-10 (1987); Vermont:
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 808 (1984); West Virginia: W. VA CODE § 30-2-5a (1986).
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2. The Detailed Liability Provisions
The detailed liability provisions of section 621.07 set out four
separate aspects of liability: (1) the liability of the active wrong-
doer and his supervisors for breach of duty to a client; (2) the lia-
bility of shareholders other than the active wrongdoer and the
wrongdoer's supervisors for breach of duty to a client; (3) share-
holder liability for the ordinary business debts of the PSC; and (4)
the liability of the PSC itself.
Perhaps the clearest aspect of section 621.07 is the retention of
personal liability for the shareholder who breaches a duty to a cli-
ent and for the active wrongdoer's direct supervisor. The Act pro-
vides that:
[A]ny officer, agent, or employee of a corporation organized under
this act shall be personally liable and accountable only for negli-
gent or wrongful acts or misconduct committed by him, or by any
person under his direct supervision and control, while rendering
professional service on behalf of the corporation to the person for
whom such professional services were being rendered . . ..
Since the word "only" follows "personally liable and accountable,"
this clause does more than define the liability of active wrongdoers
and their supervisors for breach of a professional duty to a client.4
Whatever additional ramifications the word "only" may have, the
clause, at the very least, is clear in one respect: any shareholder of
a PSC who breaches a duty to a client while rendering professional
services to the client renders himself and his direct supervisor per-
sonally liable for any damage to the client.
This result is entirely consistent with the purpose behind the
Act. State legislatures nationwide recognized the PSC as a legiti-
mate business entity so that professionals could take advantage of
certain efficiencies and benefits of the corporate form, but they did
not intend to shield professionals from liability for their personal
acts of professional negligence or misconduct.5 5 As observed by the
Florida Supreme Court, "[tihe privilege of incorporation was most
53. FLA. STAT. § 621.07 (1985).
54. The word "only" affects the vicarious liability of innocent shareholders for acts of
professional misconduct, and may eliminate the personal liability of any shareholder for acts
other than professional misconduct. See infra text accompanying notes 69-77.
55. Even under general principles of corporate law, an individual is personally liable for
his own torts, and his status as shareholder or employee does not change this rule. SEAVEY,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 129 (1964). E.g., In re Fields, 44 B.R. 322 (Bkrtcy. Fla.
1984). See Vantage View, Inc. v. Bali E. Dev. Corp., 421 So. 2d 728, 735 (Fla. 4th DCA
LIMITED LIABILITY
definitely not created or extended [to professionals] in order that
those availing themselves of the benefits could be cloaked with an
immunity inimical to legal order and public interest." 6 Thus, the
Act retains personal liability for shareholders and their supervisors
for breach of a duty to a client.
While the Act clearly retains personal liability for active wrong-
doers and their supervisors, the Act is equally clear in eliminating
vicarious liability of innocent shareholders for their fellow share-
holders' breach of duty to clients. Section 621.07 states, with re-
spect to acts of professional misconduct, that a shareholder "shall
be personally liable ... only for ... acts or misconduct committed
by him, or by any person under his direct supervision and control.
... Thus, whether section 621.07 shields innocent shareholders
from vicarious liability for acts of professional misconduct depends
upon construction of the word "only."
The word "only" is a restrictive word and a word of limitation. 8
Courts have had little trouble in ascertaining the plain meaning of
the word "only" and typically have construed it in accordance with
the prevailing dictionary definitions to mean "exclusively," "alone
in its class," "solely," "singly," "merely," "without others of the
same class or kind," "this and no other," "without anything more,"
or "in no otherwise. '5 There being no disagreement as to the
meaning of "only," the confusion faced by courts in construing
statutes containing the word stems not from the word's meaning,
but from its placement in the clause or sentence.6
1982). See also MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANNOTATED § 34 (1984); Paas, supra note 16, at
374.
56. Street v. Sugerman, 202 So. 2d 749, 751 (Fla. 1967). It should be emphasized, how-
ever, that merely because a professional incorporated for tax reasons was not a sufficient
justification for disregarding the corporate form. See Kline v. Kline, 104 Mich. App. 700,
305 N.W.2d 297 (1981) (court erred in disregarding professional corporation in garnishment
proceeding brought by single shareholder's former wife: court "will not hold that the pur-
pose of incorporating to enjoy federal tax benefits is such a purpose as will entitle a court to
automatically disregard the corporate fiction").
57. FLA. STAT. § 621.07 (1985) (emphasis added).
58. See, e.g., Dolan v. Hoosier Casualty Co., 252 Iowa 118, 110 N.W.2d 334, 336 (1961);
Cummings v. Lockwood, 84 Ariz. 335, 327 P.2d 1012, 1015 (1958); White Stores Inc. v. At-
kins, 202 Tenn. 180, 303 S.W.2d 720, 726 (1957).
59. See, e.g., Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. v. Whitaker, 489 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1972); Greer v. Chelewski, 162 Neb. 450, 456, 76 N.W.2d 438, 443 (1956); State v.
Bosch, 125 Mont. 566, 587, 242 P.2d 477, 487 (1952); Ex parte Salhus, 63 N.D. 238, 240, 247
N.W. 401, 402 (1933).
60. See, e.g., Second Nat'l Bank v. New Bank, 215 Va. 132, 134, 210 S.E.2d 136, 138
(1974) (use of word "only" within statute providing that Commonwealth, any party in inter-
est, or any party aggrieved by any final finding, decision settling substantive law, order, or
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"Only" can modify a verb, adjective, preposition, phrase, clause,
another adverb, or a sentence." Consequently, given the length
and complexity of many statutory provisions, careful placement of
the word "only" is important to clarify which word or group of
words is being limited or restricted. As a rule of statutory construc-
tion, courts strive to interpret "only" as restricting "the word [or
words] to which it naturally belongs."62 Ascertaining an adverb's
"natural" reference necessarily requires resort to grammatical
rules. The usage panel for the American Heritage Dictionary sug-
gests that, as a general rule, optimum clarity in placement of the
word "only" is achieved by "having 'only' adjoin the word or group
of words it actually limits. 63
In section 621.07, the word "only" adjoins the words "shall be
personally liable and accountable. 6 4 Thus, applying the foregoing
grammatical rule, the word "only," as used in section 621.07, modi-
fies "personally liable and accountable," thereby restricting the
range of personal liability to the types of actions enumerated in
the statute. Under the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory
language, therefore, a shareholder has personal liability for the fol-
lowing acts and no others: acts of professional misconduct he com-
mits himself, or such acts committed by another professional
under his direct supervision and control.
This conclusion is also supported by the history of section
621.07. As originally enacted, the Act contained the identical sav-
ings clause it contains today, but the detailed personal liability
provisions of section 621.07 were not quite as precise as the current
provisions. The original personal liability provisions stated that:
Any officer, shareholder, agent or employee of a corporation or-
ganized under this Act shall remain personally and fully liable
and accountable for any negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct
committed by him, or by any person under his direct supervision
and control, while rendering professional service on behalf of the
corporation to the person for whom such professional services
were being rendered.6 5
judgment of corporation commission shall have, of right, an appeal to Supreme Court only,
relates to court to which appeals may be taken and not to action which an aggrieved party
may take).
61. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1981).
62. See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Mahon, 13 N.D. 516, 101 N.W. 903 (1904).
63. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 919 (1973).
64. FLA. STAT. § 621.07 (1985).
65. Ch. 61-64, § 7, 1961 Fla. Laws 93.
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In 1967, section 621.07 was amended to its current form to provide
personal liability "only" for the enumerated acts of professional
misconduct and to provide further that liability of PSC sharehold-
ers shall be "no greater in any aspect than that of a shareholder-
employee of a [general business corporation].""6
Arguably, the original version of section 621.07 limited a share-
holder's liability to breaches of client-related duties committed by
him or someone under his direct supervision and control." The
point is moot, however, since, as one commentator noted, "[tihe
1967 amendments [to section 621.07] clarify beyond all doubt that
such a limitation [of liability] does exist."68 Thus, the Act's elimi-
nation of innocent shareholders' liability for professional negli-
gence or misconduct they neither supervised nor participated in
seems undeniable.
"Ordinary business debts" of the PSC encompass all claims
against the PSC or its shareholders for acts other than professional
negligence or misconduct, ranging from ordinary tort liability for a
"slip and fall" to contractual liability for breach of a lease agree-
ment. 9 At least one, and arguably two, clauses in the detailed lia-
bility provisions of section 621.07 limit shareholder liability for or-
dinary business debts. Either clause independently provides such a
limitation of liability; together, their effect is indisputable.
66. Ch. 67-590, § 2, 1967 Fla. Laws 93.
67. See Buchmann & Bearden, supra, note 5, at 5 (the 1961 Act "seems to impose the
personal liability on the one rendering the services to the person receiving them, with no
carry over to the other shareholders"); Jacobs, Florida's Professional Service Corporation
Act, 42 FLA. B.J. 149, 155 (1968) ("As it was originally passed, the Florida Professional Cor-
poration Act provided by implication such a limitation of liability"). But see Kurzner v.
United States, 413 F.2d 97, 107 (5th Cir. 1969) ("the scope of the personal liability imposed
by ]originall section [621.07] was unclear"). Interestingly, the New York statute, which con-
tains language virtually identical to that of original section 621.07, has been construed to
provide limited liability. See We're Assocs. Co. v. Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, 65 N.Y.2d 148,
480 N.E.2d :357, 490 N.Y.S.2d 743 (N.Y. 1985) (absent showing of abuse of corporate form of
doing business, shareholders of professional service corporation may not be held personally
liable for an ordinary business debt of the corporation). Unlike original section 621.07, how-
ever, the New York statute does not contain a general savings clause. See McKINNEY's Bus.
CORP. L. § 1505(a). Arguably, therefore, the New York decisions would not be persuasive in
construing former section 621.07 of the Florida Act, since the less precise language of de-
tailed liability provisions contained in the the original section 621.07 might not have been
clear enough to resolve all ambiguities created by the general savings clause. Cf. Note, supra
note 46, at 836 (analyzing the Pennsylvania statute which, like Florida's, contains a general
savings clause).
68. Jacobs, supra note 67, at 155. See also Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97, 107-08
(5th Cir. 1969).
69. See Rotgin, supra note 13, at 634; Note, Incorporating the Professional Prac-
tice-Still Advantageous in 1985?, 54 UMKC L. REv. 284, 286 (1986).
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The first of these clauses that arguably eliminates liability for
ordinary business debts is the same clause that clearly limits liabil-
ity for acts of professional misconduct: a shareholder "shall be per-
sonally liable and accountable only" for professional misconduct
"committed by him, or by any person under his direct supervision
and control, while rendering professional service on behalf of the
[PSC] to the person for whom such professional services were be-
ing rendered. '70 There are at least two possible interpretations of
this clause. First, it could be interpreted to provide that a share-
holder will be personally liable for professional misconduct only
when he or someone he is supervising commits such misconduct.
Under this reading, the clause merely states the circumstances
under which a shareholder is personally liable for a particular type
of wrong-professional misconduct-and has no impact on liability
for ordinary business debts.
Alternatively, the clause could be interpreted to provide that a
shareholder shall have no personal liability for claims of any kind
other than claims against him for acts of professional misconduct
that he or someone he supervised committed. Under this reading,
the clause is not merely a limitation on a specific type of claim but
rather is a limitation on the full range of potential claims against
shareholders, including both claims for professional misconduct
and for ordinary business debts.
Of these two possible interpretations, a reading that eliminates
personal liability for ordinary business debts seems more reasona-
ble. The purpose behind the Act's detailed liability provisions was
to comply with IRS guidelines on "corporateness" so as to make
professionals eligible for tax advantages conferred on corporations.
Under the IRS guidelines, limited liability, one of the indicia of
"corporateness," did not exist unless under state law71 PSC share-
holders' personal liability was "no greater in any aspect than that
of shareholder-employees of an ordinary business corporation." 2
Because shareholders of ordinary business corporations are not
personally liable for ordinary business debts,73 it seems logical to
70. FLA. STAT. § 621.07 (1985) (emphasis added).
71. "Corporateness" was determined by state, not federal law. See Kurzner v. United
States, 413 F.2d 97, 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1969); In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla.
1961).
72. T.D. 6797, 1965-1 C.B. 556.
73. As a general rule, a creditor of the corporation must look to the entity alone for
satisfaction of a debt. See Riley v. Fatt, 47 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1950). This rule applies whether
the debt is based upon contractual or tort liability. See Vantage View, Inc. v. Bali E. Dev.
Corp., 421 So. 2d 728, 735 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) ("purpose of corporate law.., is to insulate
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conclude that a clause providing for shareholders' "only" personal
liability would eliminate liability for ordinary business debts. "
For ordinary business debts, the effect of the clause providing
for shareholders' "only" personal liability is academic, in light of
the clause immediately following it. That clause, which tracks the
language of the IRS guidelines,"7 provides that "the personal liabil-
ity of shareholders of a corporation organized under this act, in
their capacity as shareholders of such corporation, shall be no
greater in any aspect than that of a shareholder-employee of a cor-
poration organized under [the Florida General Corporation Act]."7 6
Since shareholders of ordinary business corporations are not per-
sonally liable for ordinary business debts, if the first clause provid-
ing for a shareholder's "only" personal liability is construed to
eliminate liability for ordinary business debts, the second clause is
merely redundant. If the first clause is not so construed, the second
clause most assuredly provides such a limitation on liability. Thus,
either way, section 621.07 provides for limited liability with respect
to ordinary business debts.
The final aspect of liability covered by section 621.07 concerns
the liability of the PSC itself. The statute provides that "[tjhe cor-
poration shall be liable up to the full value of its property for any
negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct committed by any of its
officers, agents, or employees while they are engaged on behalf of
the corporation in the rendering of professional services.17  This
clause merely recites well established corporate principles of entity
liability and has no impact on personal liability of shareholders. As
such, the detailed liability provisions discussed earlier remain un-
ambiguous in limiting personal liability of shareholders. Because
an investor ... from personal liability for the torts of a separate corporate entity"). See also
Westerman v. Polygard, Inc., 395 So. 2d 641, 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (debtors who never did
any business with creditor individually but only in corporate capacity, were not individually
liable). However, personal liability will attach where the shareholder is an active wrongdoer,
Vantage View, 421 So. 2d at 735; where the shareholder personally guarantees the debt, see
infra note 141; or where circumstances justify piercing the corporate veil. See generally
Reininger, The Corporate Veil in Florida-Armor or Lace?, 54 FLA. B.J. 202 (1980).
74. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the clause as it now reads is far clearer
than the original version contained in the 1981 Act. The New York Court of Appeals, in
construing its own PSC provisions on limited liability, interpreted language virtually identi-
cal to that contained in the original version of the Florida Act so as to eliminate personal
liability for ordinary business debts. See We're Assoc. Co. v. Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, 65
N.Y.2d 148, 480 N.E.2d 357, 490 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
75. See T.D. 6797, 1965-1 C.B. 556.
76. FLA. STAT. § 621.07 (1985).
77. This conclusion is buttressed by section 621.13.
78. FLA. STAT. § 621.07 (1985).
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section 621.07 is unambiguous, the plain, ordinary meaning of the
words used should control to provide for limited personal liability
of PSC shareholders. 79
B. Judicial Interpretation
An additional and reliable indicium of a statute's clarity is con-
sistent judicial interpretation of the language employed by the leg-
islature."0 Both state and federal courts have consistently con-
strued section 621.07 to confer limited liability.
1. State Court Decisions
Soon after the Act became effective, the Florida Bar filed an
original petition in the Florida Supreme Court requesting approval
of amendments to the Integration Rule and Code of Ethics to en-
able members of the bar to practice law through PSCs. The court
considered the petition in In re Florida Bars' and announced the
rules under which attorneys could establish PSCs for the practice
of law. The court first explained that, notwithstanding the legisla-
ture's power to permit "professionals" to establish PSCs, the Act
was not self-executing as applied to attorneys:
[Tihe responsibility which the Constitution imposes upon us to
supervise admissions to the practice of law and the discipline of
those admitted, necessarily requires an examination by this Court
into any proposal that directly affects these two constitutional
functions. Enabling action by this Court is therefore an essential
condition precedent to authorize members of The Florida Bar to
qualify under and engage in the practice of their profession pur-
suant to The 1961 Act.s2
The court thus made clear that the Act in no way diminished the
court's control over attorneys and the practice of law.
79. Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So. 2d 879
(Fla. 1983) (where statutory language is unambiguous, the court need look no further than
statute itself); Carson v. Miller, 370 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1979) (unambiguous statutory language
must be accorded its plain meaning); State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973) (where legisla-
tive intent as evidenced by statute is plain and unambiguous, then there is no necessity for
any construction or interpretation of the statute and effect need only be given to the plain
meaning of its terms).
80. Rickard v. Auto Publisher, Inc., 735 F.2d 450, 455 (11th Cir. 1984). See also Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (1980).
81. 133 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961).
82. Id. at 555.
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The court then examined the reasons why the Florida Legisla-
ture enacted the Professional Service Corporation Act. Well aware
of the legislature's desire to make professionals eligible for tax ben-
efits available to corporations or entities with certain corporate at-
tributes, the court observed that the Act was "a frank and forth-
right effort to adapt certain business and professional relationships
to the requirements of the Internal Revenue Service in order that
the members of such businesses or professions may be placed on
an equal footing with other taxpayers.""3 This analysis of purpose
was not merely historical background. The court explicitly stated
that it would be guided by the Act's purpose in any future inter-
pretation of the Rules it prescribed for the practice of law through
PSCs.
Having acknowledged the importance of tax benefits to PSCs,
the court examined whether the Act actually conferred the re-
quired corporate attributes so as to make professionals eligible for
those benefits. As to limited liability, the court was initially
slightly ambiguous. Stressing the "highly personal obligation of the
lawyer to his client," the court stated that "[in addition to the
individual liability and responsibility of the stockholder, the cor-
porate entity will be liable for the misprisions of its members to
the extent of the corporate assets." 84 The ambiguity stems from
the court's emphasis on the personal liability of the wrongdoer and
of the PSC, rather than on the innocent shareholder's insulation
from liability. By emphasizing who was, rather than who was not,
liable for a shareholder's malpractice, the court's definition of
shareholder liability was less precise than it might have been had
the court affirmatively stated that innocent shareholders enjoy lim-
ited liability.
The context, however, clarifies any ambiguity created by the
court's emphasis. Earlier in the same paragraph, the court said
that the "corporate entity as a method of doing business will not
be permitted to protect the unfaithful or the unethical. ' s8 Thus,
"individual liability and responsibility""6 attaches to the "unethi-
cal or unfaithful" shareholder, not to innocent shareholders who
neither supervised nor participated in the wrongful conduct. Such
83. Id. at 556.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. Presumably "individual" liability means personal liability. See, e.g., Mann v. Price,
434 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (finding "individual liability" in former share-
holder's suit against attorney shareholders of professional association).
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a construction is consistent with the scope of liability for breach of
duty to a client as defined by the plain language of the statute.
Unlike the description of malpractice liability, the court's discus-
sion of liability for ordinary business debts was clear. The court
declared that "[tihere will be liability for corporate debts to the
limit of corporate assets."87 Thus, the court appears to have con-
strued section 621.07 as eliminating shareholders' personal liability
for the PSC's ordinary business debts.
Although the court confirmed that PSC shareholders enjoy lim-
ited liability, the court was speaking in the abstract. The case in-
volved an original petition in which the court issued rules of prac-
tice; it did not actually involve a suit against a shareholder either
for malpractice or for recovery of a business debt. Therefore, while
the court's language was strong, it cannot be considered a disposi-
tive interpretation of the statute.8 8 This is especially true in light
of the fact that the court's interpretation clearly was influenced by
the Act's purpose of creating tax equality between professionals
and ordinary business corporations.8 Now that the Tax Code has
been revised to confer many tax benefits on professionals with or
without the PSC infrastructure, it is conceivable that, if con-
fronted with a case involving a suit against a shareholder, the court
would at least reconsider if not revise, its interpretation.
The impact an actual controversy involving a suit against a
shareholder could have on the court's interpretation is made ap-
parent in Street v. Sugerman.90 In Sugerman, a nonprofessional
judgment creditor obtained a judgment against two attorneys in
their individual capacities. The attorneys owned 90% of the stock
in a PSC but the judgment was not against the PSC. The creditor
executed on the judgment and levied upon the attorneys' stock in
the corporation. The attorneys sought to permanently enjoin the
sale of the stock, relying on the provisions of the Act prohibiting a
shareholder of a PSC from selling or transferring his shares to any-
87. In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d at 557.
88. Cf. Birt v. St. Mary Mercy Hosp., Inc., 175 Ind. App. 32, 42, 370 N.E.2d 379, 385
(Ind. App. 1977) (in promulgating rules governing the practice of law through PSCs, Indiana
Supreme Court was not bound to the specific terms of the statute; thus, supreme court's
opinion in rulemaking capacity was not controlling in subsequent case involving purely a
question of statutory construction).
89. In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d at 556.
90. 202 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1967).
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one who is ineligible to be a shareholder."1 The attorneys argued
that because only licensed attorneys are eligible to be shareholders
in a legal PSC,92 the forced sale of the stock would contravene the
Act's provisions on limited transferability of stock. The trial court
agreed and granted the injunction.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the Act's limitation
on the voluntary transfer of shares did not preclude execution and
forced sale by law for a judgment creditor.9 3 The supreme court
affirmed and, in language that could be applied to the concept of
limited liability, articulated the policy behind its affirmance:
We noted in the case of In re The Florida Bar, [citation omitted],
that professional service corporations evolved and were designed
primarily for the purpose of allowing various professions, not pre-
viously privileged to incorporate, to form organizations that
would legitimately qualify for certain tax or retirement advan-
tages available to corporations. The privilege of incorporation was
most definitely not created or extended in order that those avail-
ing themselves of the benefits could be cloaked with an immunity
inimical to legal order and public interest. 4
To the extent that a limitation of personal liability could be con-
strued as "inimical to the legal order and public interest,"95 the
court may be willing to employ this reasoning to cut back on the
scope of the "immunity" in an appropriate case.
The Sugerman decision, however, may not be as detrimental to
limited personal liability as it appears. For tax purposes, one of the
indicia of corporateness identified by the IRS was free transferabil-
ity of interests of ownership. 6 Logically, the fewer restrictions
placed on the transfer of shares, the greater the likelihood that the
corporate characteristic of free transferability will be found. Thus,
the Act's restrictions on transfer of shares to nonprofessionals was
an exception to the legislature's attempt to confer this corporate
characteristic on PSCs. By construing that restriction narrowly to
permit the transfer of shares through a judicial sale, the Sugerman
91. See FLA. STAT. § 621.11 (1985) ("No shareholder of a corporation organized under
this act may sell or transfer his shares in such corporation except to another individual who
is eligible to be a shareholder of such corporation").
92. FLA. STAT. § 621.09 (1985); 061-139 Fla. Op. Atty. Gen. 234, 235 (1961).
93. Sugerman v. Street, 198 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967), aff'd, 202 So. 2d 749 (Fla.
1967).
94. Sugerman, 202 So. 2d at 751.
95. Id.
96. See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
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court actually furthered the purpose of the Act to imbue PSCs
with the corporate attributes deemed essential by the IRS. Thus,
Sugerman could be construed as attaching paramount importance
to the Act's purpose of establishing these corporate attributes. As
such, Sugerman would support a plain reading of section 621.07 to
find limited liability, just as it rejected a strained reading of the
Act which placed undue restrictions on the transfer of shares.
2. Federal Tax Decisions
The Florida Supreme Court in In re Florida Bar cautioned that
although the Act was designed to confer corporate attributes on
professional associations, it could not be assumed that every entity
formed pursuant to the Act would "gain the stamp of approval of
the taxing authorities. '97 True to the court's warnings, the IRS did
in fact challenge corporate tax benefits claimed by shareholders of
certain entities formed under the Act. In the two decisions dis-
cussed below, the courts rejected the IRS' challenge and, in the
process, left no doubt that the Act provides for limited liability.
In Smith v. United States,98 a taxpayer sought a refund of in-
come taxes, claiming that the taxes had been collected erroneously.
The taxpayer was a shareholder in a professional medical associa-
tion that had continuously engaged in the practice of medicine
since the year the Act became effective. Relying on the original
regulations it promulgated in 1960 and the more restrictive regula-
tions promulgated in 1965, the IRS taxed the association as a part-
nership, determining that the association lacked sufficient corpo-
rate characteristics to qualify for corporate tax benefits.
The taxpayer challenged the IRS' determination in the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and the court
found for the taxpayer. The court first declared the restrictive 1965
regulations invalid,99 and proceeded to analyze the nature of the
association under the indicia of corporateness identified by the
IRS in its 1960 regulations and by the Supreme Court in Morrissey
v. Commissioner:100 limited liability, centralized management, con-
tinuity of life, and transferability of ownership interests. Applying
these criteria, the Smith court concluded that the association pos-
sessed sufficient corporate characteristics to qualify for corporate
97. In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d at 557.
98. 301 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
99. Id. at 1020-22.
100. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
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tax benefits. In so doing, the court analyzed each of the Morrissey
criteria, and, in particular, examined the scope of liability for
shareholders of PSCs formed under the Act:
The stockholders of the Professional Association, by virtue of
the provisions of § 621.13, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., have sharply
limited liability. Their liability differs from the liability of a
stockholder in any other corporation only in that each is person-
ally liable for negligent or wrongful acts performed by him or by
any employee under his direct supervision or control.'0 '
A similar situation arose in Kurzner v. United States,'0 2 which
involved another suit for refund of taxes paid by a physician who
was a shareholder in a PSC formed under the Act. As in Smith,
the government determined that the entity lacked the requisite
corporate characteristics to qualify for corporate tax benefits. The
trial court, in an opinion adopted almost verbatim from the Smith
case, 0 3 rejected the Commissioner's position. The trial court based
its holding in part upon its finding that the Act conferred signifi-
cant corporate attributes, including limited liability. 04 The govern-
ment appealed, and in an extensive opinion the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 0 5
The appellate court elaborated on the trial court's finding that
the Act conferred limited liability, explaining in particular the im-
port of the 1967 amendments to section 621.07:
[A]s a corporation, a professional service corporation "permits the
limitation of liability of participants to the property embarked in
the undertaking." However, in a seeming excess of caution, sec-
tion 621.07 of the [original] act made clear that the shareholder-
professionals would not be immune from liability for their own
conduct: Any officer, shareholder, agent or employee of a corpora-
tion organized under this Act shall remain personally and fully
liable and accountable for any negligent or wrongful acts or mis-
conduct committed by him, or by any person under his direct su-
101. Smith, 301 F. Supp. at 1022. Section 621.13 defines the interrelationship between
Chapter 607, Florida's General Corporation Act, and Chapter 621: Chapter 607 is applicable
to a corporation organized pursuant to Chapter 621, except to the extent that provisions of
621 conflict with those of 607, and in such case, provisions of 621 shall take precedence.
102. 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969).
103. Compare Kurzner v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1968), aff'd, 413
F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969), with Smith, 301 F. Supp. at 1016.
104. Kurzner, 286 F. Supp. at 845.
105. Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969).
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pervision and control, while rendering professional service on be-
half of the corporation to the person for whom such professional
services were being rendered. Since the scope of the personal lia-
bility imposed by this section was unclear, the Florida legislature
in 1967 added a clarifying proviso:
"[Tihe personal liability of shareholders of a corporation organ-
ized under this act, in their capacity as shareholders of such cor-
poration, shall be no greater in any aspect than that of a share-
holder-employee of a corporation organized under [the general
corporation laws] chapter 608." Thus personal liability is limited
in a professional corporation to the same extent as in any other
corporation. Although a shareholder-employee must necessarily
be responsible for his misconduct, the corporate form nonetheless
shields the shareholder from a considerable amount of contrac-
tual and tort liability.106
Kurzner is the most recent case construing section 621.07 to con-
fer limited liability upon PSC shareholders. Decided in 1969, it is
also the only case to discuss limited liability since the adoption of
the 1967 amendments to section 621.07. If anything, the statute
has become more clear with respect to limited liability since the
passage of these amendments. Thus, when viewed in light of the
courts' prior decisions in Smith, Sugerman, and In re Florida Bar,
a consistent theme has developed in both the state and federal de-
cisions construing the Act's liability provisions. This consistent ju-
dicial interpretation confirms the clarity of section 621.07 and sup-
ports a finding of limited liability based upon the plain meaning of
the statutory language.
III. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OUTSIDE FLORIDA
Courts in several jurisdictions outside Florida have been strongly
influenced by public policy in determining attorney shareholders'
personal liability in professional legal corporations.10 7 Although not
always explicitly set forth, the chief policy considerations motivat-
106. Id. at 107-08.
107. E.g., First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674 (1983); South
High Dev., Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 1., 445 N.E.2d 1106 (1983);
Infosearch, Inc. v. Horowitz, 117 Misc. 2d 774, 459 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Civ. Ct. 1982); Zimmer-
man v. Hogg & Allen, 22 N.C. App. 544, 207 S.E.2d 267, rev'd on other grounds, 286 N.C.
24, 209 S.E.2d 795 (1974); In re Bar Ass'n, 55 Haw. 121, 516 P.2d 1267 (Haw. 1973). See
generally Paas, supra note 16; Note, Professional Legal Corporations: Limited or Unlim-
ited Liability for Shareholders in Missouri After First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 28 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 297 (1984); Comment, Professional Corporations-Shareholder Liability in
Ohio: Confounding Attorneys and Others, 17 AKRON L. REv. 143 (1983).
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ing these courts appear to be the special nature of the relationship
both between a lawyer and his client, and between a lawyer and
the other members of his law firm."0 8 In effect, these courts have
established a different set of rules for limited liability of PSCs with
attorney shareholders, allowing all professions except the legal pro-
fession to enjoy limited liability."9 While these different rules stem
from the same policy considerations, courts have offered several
justifications for different treatment for lawyers. These reasons,
sometimes adopted by the same court in a single opinion, fall into
two general classifications: overly broad attempts to abrogate lim-
ited liability for attorneys, and specific attempts to expand attor-
neys' personal liability.
A. Overbroad Attempts to Abrogate Limited Liability for
Attorneys
Some justifications offered by courts for eliminating limited lia-
bility for professional legal corporations have implications reaching
far beyond the personal liability of attorneys. Though clearly moti-
vated by policies related to the legal profession, some courts have
based their holdings, at least in part, on reasoning that could be
extended to all professionals in PSCs or even to nonprofessionals
engaged in business through closely held corporations.
1. Shareholder Participation in Management
In deciding that attorneys are not entitled to limited liability,
some courts have focused on the PSC shareholder's closeness to
the management of the corporation." 0 In South High Develop-
ment, Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co.,"' the Ohio Supreme
108. See, e.g., First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 846, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675
(1983).
109. Compare O'Neill v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968), aff'd, 410
F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1969) (professional medical association enjoys limited liability under Ohio
law), with South High Development, Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe, & Cromley Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 1,
445 N.E.2d 1106 (1983) (no limited liability for professional legal corporation under Ohio
law). See Birt v. St. Mary Mercy Hosp., Inc., 175 Ind. App. 32, 42, 370 N.E.2d 379, 384-85
(Ind. App. 1977) (rules imposing unlimited liability on attorney shareholders have no appli-
cation to medical PSC).
110. E.g., South High Dev., Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 1, 445
N.E.2d 1106 (1983); Infosearch, Inc. v. Horowitz, 117 Misc. 2d 774, 459 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1982)
(quoting Weiner v. Weiner D.P.M., P.C., 88 Misc. 2d 920, 924, 390 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362
(1976)). This closeness, courts have reasoned, distinguishes the PSC from the ordinary busi-
ness corporation, in that shareholders of private corporations are usually passive investors,
uninvolved in the corporation's managerial affairs. See Note, supra note 46, at 831.
111. 4 Ohio St. 3d 1, 445 N.E.2d 1106 (1983).
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Court relied heavily on this factor to impose personal liability on
attorneys for a legal PSC's ordinary business debts. In South High,
a PSC with attorney shareholders breached a lease for office space.
Even though the PSC was the only signatory to the lease, the land-
lord attempted to impose personal liability upon the PSC's attor-
ney shareholders. The landlord relied on the Ohio Supreme Court
Rules for Government of the Bar, which permitted attorneys to
form PSCs only on the condition that each attorney remain per-
sonally liable for all claims against the PSC."
Although the Ohio professional corporation statute contains no
specific provisions on shareholder liability, it does provide that the
Ohio General Corporation Law "applies to professional associa-
tions."'1 3 The limited liability provisions of this law are contained
in the Ohio Constitution, which states that "in no case shall any
stockholder be individually liable otherwise than for the unpaid
stock owned by him or her."' 14 Because limited liability for Ohio
corporations is a constitutional mandate, the defendants in South'
High argued that the constitutional provisions overrode the su-
preme court's rule requiring attorneys to assume personal
liability.1 '
Relying on its own rule, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the
defendants' argument and imposed personal liability on the attor-
ney shareholders. In reaching this result, the court acknowledged
that if the constitutional provisions limiting liability applied to
PSCs, the constitution would supercede the court's rule imposing
personal liability on attorney shareholders.""6 The court avoided
this conflict, however, by holding that the constitutionally limited
liability provisions applied only to private corporations, not to
PSCs. The court based its holding on a difference it discerned be-
tween PSCs and ordinary business corporations:
[A] private corporation's sole purpose is to accumulate capital so
that the owners, those contributing capital, may get a return on
their capital. Thus, it may reasonably be concluded that the ra-
tionale behind the constitutional protection for shareholders ap-
plies only toward private corporations and not professional ones.
112. The rule is set forth in full infra at text accompanying note 139.
113. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1785.08 (1985).
114. OHIO CONST. art. XIII, § 3.
115. South High, 4 Ohio St. 3d at 2, 445 N.E.2d at 1107.
116. Id. at 2, 445 N.E.2d at 1108 ("the limited liability.., provided by the Constitution
for shareholders of private corporations may not be varied by the General Assembly or by
this court").
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The shareholders of a professional corporation, whether legal,
medical, or other, will be the professionals who actually practice
the profession. However, the shareholders of a private corporation
will in most instances not be employees of the corporation. There-
fore, there is a logical need for shareholders of private corpora-
tions to be insulated from corporate debts since they will have no
practical participation in the management of the corporation. The
shareholders of the professional corporation will have direct con-
tact with the running of the corporation, so limited liability is not
necessary for them.117
The distinction between private and professional corporations
noted in South High is flawed for at least two fundamental rea-
sons. First, the notion that PSC shareholders will have "direct con-
tact with the running of the corporation" ignores the management
structure of large firms. A recent survey revealed that the nation's
250 largest law firms all had 100 or more lawyers." 8 Of these 250
firms, eleven had over 400 attorneys, twenty-eight had over 300,
and ninety-one had 200 or more." 9 Management in such firms is
most certainly left to a committee, and any suggestions that all
shareholders are active in daily management activities are pure
fantasy."12
A second and perhaps more fundamental flaw in the South High
court's reasoning is that such reasoning could be extended to elimi-
nate limited liability for shareholders of small closely held corpora-
tions. As stated by one critic of the South High decision:
A closely held corporation is normally characterized as a busi-
ness corporation whose shareholders are also employees, directors,
officers, and managers. If, however, participation in management
is the deciding factor, then the shareholders of a regular business
corporation should also lose their limited liability in certain cir-
cumstances. It is doubtful that the Ohio court desired to an-
nounce such a broad rule for both professional corporations and
closely-held business corporations, but its reasoning fits both
entities.12" '
117. Id. at 3, 445 N.E. 2d at 1108.
118. Nat'l L.J., Sept. 22, 1986, at s7. Four Florida firms were among the nation's largest
250.
119. Id.
120. See Paas, supra note 16, at 380 ("The assumption that all shareholders of a profes-
sional corporation are active in management is contrary to fact.").
121. Id. at 380. See also Note, supra note 46, at 832.
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Thus, the court's attempt to predicate personal liability of attor-
ney shareholders on their alleged participation in management is
based on an artificial distinction between private and professional
corporations which has no basis in law or fact.
Unlike Ohio, Florida has not enacted a rule imposing personal
liability on attorney shareholders. Nonetheless, the South High
case is significant because it is a clear example of the courts' will-
ingness to adopt tortured readings, even of constitutional provi-
sions, in order to impose personal liability on attorneys. Thus, a
Florida court conceivably could engage in similar mental gymnas-
tics to circumvent the clear language of the Florida statute and
impose partnership liability on attorney shareholders. 12 2 For these
reasons, Florida courts should reject the "participation in manage-
ment" argument and resist any temptation to so encroach upon
limited liability of PSCs with attorney shareholders. 123
2. Ancillary Rendition of Professional Services
Many statutes, including the Florida Act, impose personal liabil-
ity for wrongful acts committed "while rendering professional ser-
vices. 1 24 One court has interpreted this language broadly to ex-
pand attorney shareholders' personal liability. In Infosearch, Inc.
v. Horowitz,1 25 a New York trial court construing such language in
the New York statute22 determined that an attorney shareholder
was personally liable for an ordinary business debt of the PSC.
The court first noted the strong public policy reasons supporting
personal liability for attorney shareholders of PSCs, stating that it
would be "contrary to public policy" to "shield lawyers from the
payment of just debt. 1 27 The court explained that "[w]hen one
122. See, e.g., Infosearch, Inc. v. Horowitz, 117 Misc. 2d 774, 459 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1982).
123. See We're Assoc. Co. v. Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, P.C., 65 N.Y.2d 148, 480 N.E.2d
357, 490 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (1985); Note, supra note 46, at 832.
124. See generally Annotation, What Constitutes Professional Services Within Mean-
ing of Statute Preserving Individual Liability of Professional Employees of Professional
Corporation, Association, or Partnership, 31 A.L.R. 4TH 898 (1984).
125. 117 Misc. 2d 774, 459 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1982).
126. The New York statute provided as follows: "Each shareholder, employee or agent of
a professional service corporation shall be personally and fully liable and accountable for
any negligent or wrongful act or misconduct committed by him or by any person under his
direct supervision and control while rendering professional services on behalf of such corpo-
ration." We're Assocs., 65 N.Y.2d at 151, 480 N.E.2d at 359, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 745 (citing
McKINNEY'S Bus. CoRP. L. § 1505(a)).
127. Infosearch, 117 Misc. 2d at 774-75, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 349. This decision has been
criticized as taking an erroneous view of "just debt." Note, supra note 46, at 828 ("the
Infosearch rationale has no logical or statutory support for classifying an ordinary business
LIMITED LIABILITY
extends credit to a law firm, one expects that his debt is secured by
the legal and moral obligation of the members of that firm, not-
withstanding that it is a professional corporation.' 2 8 The Court
then announced a rule that could be applied to all PSCs, whether
comprised of lawyers or not:
[T]he statutory qualification "while rendering professional ser-
vices on behalf of such corporation" may be construed to apply to
debts incurred ancillary to the rendering of professional services,
and ... this is a reasonable construction. The only limited liabil-
ity of partners that would then remain in professional corporation
[sic] would be that based on the private, as distinguished from
corporate acts of the de facto partners. Thus, partner A would not
be liable for partner B's private debts. 29
Although in a later case the New York Court of Appeals rejected
the "ancillary services" argument adopted in Infosearch,130 the ar-
gument is somewhat attractive. Undeniably, "there are certain or-
dinary business debts that are integral to the rendition of profes-
sional services," such as the purchase of law books or charges for
continuing legal education courses. 13 ' Thus, failure to pay such
debts conceivably could be construed as an act within the personal
liability reach of a statute which imposes personal liability on
shareholders for wrongful acts committed "while rendering profes-
sional services on behalf of [the] corporation.' 1 32
While the ancillary services argument may be plausible under a
statute worded like the New York statute, the Florida Act contains
an important phrase which makes the argument implausible in this
state. The Act makes professionals personally liable for acts com-
mitted "while rendering professional service on behalf of the cor-
poration to the person for whom such professional services were
being rendered.'' 33 The underscored language makes clear that the
Act provides for personal liability only when the shareholder
breaches a duty to a client, not when he breaches a duty to a third
person providing some service or commodity that is ancillary to
debt of the corporation as a just debt of the individual attorney-shareholder"). See also
Paas, supra note 16, at 378.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 350.
130. We're Assocs., 65 N.Y.2d 148, 480 N.E.2d 357, 490 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
131. See Note, supra note 46, at 832.
132. Id. (citing Infosearch, 117 Misc. 2d at 776, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 350).
133. FLA. STAT. § 621.07 (1985) (emphasis added).
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the shareholder's rendering of professional services to the client.
Thus, the "ancillary services" argument is not viable in Florida.
B. Lawyers-Specific Attempts to Expand Personal Liability
Despite their potentially broad ramifications, both the "partici-
pation in management" and "ancillary services" arguments were
employed to reach relatively narrow results: to impose personal lia-
bility on attorney shareholders of PSCs. In addition to these argu-
ments, courts have taken more direct and, perhaps, more intellec-
tually honest approaches to reach the same result. The direct
approaches involve one form or another of the judiciary's supervi-
sory power over attorneys and the practice of law.
1. Elimination of Limited Liability through Formal Rulemak-
ing Procedures
In Formal Opinion 303,11" the American Bar Association (ABA)
Committee on Professional Ethics concluded that lawyers could,
without violating the Canon of Ethics, practice law as PSCs, pro-
vided "appropriate safeguards are observed."' 5 With respect to
limited liability, the Opinion requires the "following safeguards: 1.
The lawyer or lawyers rendering the legal services to the client
must be personally responsible to the client. 2. Restrictions on lia-
bility as to other lawyers in the organization must be made appar-
ent to the client."'136
In In re Florida Bar, the Florida Supreme Court basically
adopted the position of the Committee. 137 The rules announced in
that decision imposed no greater "safeguards" with respect to lim-
ited liability than those set forth in Formal Opinion 303.138 There-
134. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 303 (1961).
135. Id. at 667.
136. Id. at 663.
137. 133 So. 2d 554 (1961). Other state courts have taken different positions. See In re
Bar Ass'n, 516 P.2d 1267 (Haw. 1973) (court required joint and several liability of attorneys
in PSCs, expressly rejecting bar association's proposed rule providing limited liability of
incorporated attorneys); In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 106 R.I. 752, 263 A.2d 692 (R.I. 1970)
(approving limited liability for attorneys in PSCs only if attorneys carry mandatory mal-
practice insurance). See generally Note, supra note 107, at 305-06.
138. The rules as originally enacted in 1961 are set forth in In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d
at 554. The most recent version of the rules contained in Articles II,.X and XV of the 1986
Integration Rules of the Florida Bar, were very similar to the original rules. Article II pro-
vided generally that:
Professional service corporations organized under The Professional Service Corpo-
ration Act are not prohibited by this article from engaging in the practice of law,
so long as such corporation and all of its shareholders, officers, directors, agents
LIMITED LIABILITY
fore, the Florida Supreme Court's rules required, at a minimum,
and employees who are members of The Florida Bar comply with the applicable
provisions of the Integration Rule and By-Laws of The Florida Bar.
1986 Int. R. Fla. Bar, Art. II § 7 (repealed). More detailed provisions were contained in
Article XV:
1. Professional service corporations organized under Florida Statutes chapter
608 pursuant to Florida Statutes chapter 621 to practice law pursuant to the pro-
visions of The Professional Service Corporation Act are authorized to engage in
the practice of law in Florida but only while all shareholders of such corporation
are active members of the Florida Bar in good standing and only while such cor-
poration and all of its shareholders, officers, directors, agents and employees com-
ply with the provisions of The Professional Service Corporation Act and the appli-
cable provisions of the Integration Rule and By-Laws of The Florida Bar.
2. No professional service corporation may engage in the practice of law except
through officers, agents or employees who are active members of The Florida Bar
in good standing.
3. No person shall serve as a director of a professional service corporation en-
gaged in the practice of law except an active member of The Florida Bar in good
standing. No person shall be elected or shall serve as an executive officer of any
such corporation except a person who is a shareholder in such corporation. For
this purpose the term "executive officer" shall not include the secretary of a pro-
fessional service corporation having only one shareholder.
4. A lawyer who, while acting as a shareholder, officer, director, agent or em-
ployee of a professional service corporation engaged in the practice of law, violates
or sanctions the violation of the provisions of The Professional Service Corpora-
tion Act or the Integration Rule or By-Laws of The Florida Bar specifically relat-
ing thereto shall be subject to disciplinary action.
Id. Art. XV (repealed). Article XV was added to the Integration Rule in 1961, In re Florida
Bar, 133 So. 2d at 557-58, and was amended to the version quoted above in 1975. See In re
Florida Bar, 317 So. 2d 65 (1970). Finally, Article X of the 1986 Integration Rules also
impacted PSCs with attorney shareholders. Article X was the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility as adopted by the Supreme Court in 1970. See In re Integration Rule of Fla. Bar,
235 So. 2d 723, 724 (Fla. 1970). As relevant to the subject of limited liability of attorneys,
the Code provided as follows:
EC 6-6. A lawyer should not seek, by contract or other means, to limit his indi-
vidual liability to his client for his malpractice. A lawyer who handles the affairs
of his client properly has no need to attempt to limit his liability for his profes-
sional activities and one who does not handle the affairs of his client properly
should not be permitted to do so. A lawyer who is a stockholder in or is associated
with a professional legal corporation may, however, limit his liability for malprac-
tice of his associates in the corporation, but only to the extent permitted by law.
DR 6-102. Limiting Liability to Client
(A) A lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate himself from or limit his liability to
his client for his personal malpractice.
1986 Int. R. of Fla. Bar, art. X (amended).
Effective January 1, 1987, the 1986 Integration Rules were superseded by the Rules Regu-
lating the Florida Bar. See Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1986).
The new rules omit the provisions pertaining to professional service corporations. Thus,
there are no current regulations authorizing lawyers to practice in PSCs. Arguably, in light
of the supreme court's statement that the PSC Act is not self-executing as to attorneys, see
In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 1986), attorneys may no longer practice law
through PSCs. It seems doubtful that the court intended to effect such a sweeping change
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personal liability of the person providing professional services. Be-
cause the Florida Act imposes such liability, the statute's liability
provisions are consistent with the supreme court's enabling rules in
Florida.
Other state supreme courts have imposed liability-related safe-
guards in addition to those recommended by the ABA Committee
and adopted by the Florida Supreme Court. For example, in Ohio,
the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar provide
as follows: "The participation by an individual as a shareholder of
a legal professional association shall be on the condition that such
individual shall, and by such participation does, guarantee the fi-
nancial responsibility of the association for its breach of any duty,
whether or not arising from the attorney-client relationship.""1 9
Relying on its plenary power over the bar, the Ohio Supreme Court
in South High interpreted this rule to impose personal liability on
all attorney shareholders for the PSC's ordinary business debt."'
Similarly, by order of the supreme court, Indiana imposed per-
sonal liability upon attorney shareholders of PSCs:
Incorporation by two or more lawyers associated in the practice
shall not modify any law applicable to the relationship between
the person or persons furnishing professional services and the
person receiving such service, including ... the liability of each
for all, arising out of the professional services offered by one law-
yer associated with others in the same corporation, as existed in a
partnership for the practice of law.14 1
The Indiana Supreme Court held that this rule has no application
to medical PSCs because it was promulgated under that court's
constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law."4
sub silencio, and the omissions are probably an oversight. To clarify matters, the court
should correct the omission as soon as possible.
The new rules do, however, address a lawyer's ability to limit liability for personal mal-
practice. These rules have been changed considerably from the former provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
139. Sup. Ct. Gov. Bar III, § 4.
140. South High Dev., Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe Cromley Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 1, 445 N.E. 2d
1106 (1983).
141. Order of Indiana Sup. Ct., April 10, 1970 (appendix to General Professional Corpo-
ration Act, IND. CODE § 23-1-13-1 to -11 (1971)), superseded by Admission and Discipline
Rule 27, Jan. 1, 1976, as amended Aug. 31, 1976.
142. Birt v. St. Mary Mercy Hospital, Inc., 175 Ind. App. 32, 42, 370 N.E.2d 379, 385
(Ind. Ct. App. 1977); see also South High, 4 Ohio St. 3d at 5, 445 N.E.2d at 1109:
Since Rule III [imposing personal liability on attorneys] is a rule promulgated
under the constitutional authority for the conduct of the bar, any law that is in-
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The Florida Supreme Court likewise possesses the constitutional
authority to regulate the practice of law,143 and the court in In re
Florida Bar affirmed the existence of this power. " ' Furthermore,
the court unequivocally stated that the practice of law through
PSCs was entirely subject to the conditions imposed thereon by
the rules of the court. 1 5 Therefore, the possibility remains that the
court could, by rule, increase attorneys' personal liability. In light
of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in In re Florida Bar, the
Ohio and Indiana decisions suggest that such an increase would
control.16
Although the supreme court may have the power to adopt rules
reducing the statutory grant of limited liability to attorneys, the
recently adopted Florida Rules of Professional Conduct""7 suggest
that the Florida Supreme Court is unlikely to do so. Before the
Rules became effective in January 1987, Florida operated under
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibited lawyers
from attempting to limit their liability for their personal malprac-
tice under any circumstances. 4" The new rule, however, provides
consistent therewith must fall. To the extent that [the Ohio PSC act] is construed
to provide limited liability to a shareholder of a legal professional association, it is
inconsistent with Section 4, Gov. R. III, and is superseded by such rule.
See also Paas, supra note 16, at 383. Cf. Fure v. Sherman Hosp., 55 Ill. App. 3d 572, 371
N.E.2d 143 (Il1. App. Ct. 1977) (Illinois Supreme Court Rule imposing personal liability on
each attorney shareholder of PSC is expressly authorized by Illinois PSC Act).
143. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15. The court also has certain inherent powers, if not limited
by the Constitution. See Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 199 So. 57, 145 Fla. 223 (1940)
(listing inherent power to regulate admission to bar).
144. In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d at 555.
145. Id. at 558 (revising Canon 33, Rule B, "Ethics Governing Attorneys") ("The forma-
tion -and use of a professional service corporation for the practice of law pursuant to the
provisions of The Professional Service Corporation Act shall be permissible, subject always
to compliance with such rules, regulations and requirements as may from time to time be
promulgated by the Supreme Court of Florida").
146. But see Paas, supra note 16, at 383-89 (criticizing courts' disregard of clear statu-
tory language on basis of separation of powers analysis).
147. See Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1986).
148. See also Florida Bar v. McQuade, 489 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1986); Florida Bar v. Gun-
ther, 390 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 1980); Florida Bar v. Leopold, 320 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1975). Other
jurisdictions adopting the Code of Professional Responsibility have also so held. See, e.g.,
Arizona: In re Preston, 111 Ariz. 102, 523 P.2d 1303 (1974); Colorado: People v. Good,
195 Colo. 177, 576 P.2d 1020 (1978); Indiana: In re Cissna, 444 N.E.2d 851 (Ind. 1983);
Kansas: In re Christian, 238 Kan. 451, 709 P.2d 987 (1985); Maryland: Attorney Griev-
ance Comm'n v. Sheehy, 298 Md. 371, 470 A.2d 341 (1984); New Jersey: In re Wallace,
104 N.J. 589, 518 A.2d 740 (1986); New York: In re Tallon, 86 A.D.2d 897, 447 N.Y.S.2d
50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); North Carolina: North Carolina State Bar v. Frazier, 62 N.C.
App. 172, 302 S.E.2d 648 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983), review denied, 308 N.C. 677, 303 S.E.2d 546
(1983); South Carolina: In re Clarke, 278 S.C. 627, 300 S.E.2d 595 (1983); Wisconsin: In
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Rubin, 123 Wis. 2d 518, 367 N.W.2d 219 (1985). But see
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that "[a] lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limit-
ing the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permit-
ted by law and the client is independently represented in making
the agreement." 49 Thus, under Florida Supreme Court rules, the
trend is to expand lawyer's opportunities to limit their liability. 5"
2. Imposition of Personal Liability by Judicial Fiat
In addition to the state supreme courts that have promulgated
administrative rules on attorney shareholder liability, at least one
court has announced a similar rule in an actual controversy involv-
ing a suit against an attorney shareholder. In First Bank & Trust
Co. v. Zagoria,15' the Georgia Supreme Court considered whether
an innocent shareholder in a legal PSC could be held personally
liable for another shareholder's breach of duty while rendering
professional services. Zagoria involved consolidated cases in which
a lender and real estate broker sued both Stoner and Zagoria, the
sole shareholders of a legal PSC, to recover on dishonored checks.
While acting as the closing attorney in separate transactions,
Zagoria issued the checks drawn on the PSC's escrow account.
Zagoria then withdrew funds from the account so as to cause the
checks to be dishonored. Stoner did not participate in the closings
or take part in any of the withdrawals.
The lender and real estate agent sued the PSC and both Stoner
and Zagoria individually. The trial court entered summary judg-
ment in favor of Stoner and the court of appeals affirmed, explain-
ing that personal liability attached only to the attorney share-
holder who rendered the professional services out of which the
claim arose.15 2 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed and
held that a lawyer, whether a partner in a partnership or a share-
Cohen v. Surrey, Karasik & Morse, 427 F. Supp. 363, 379 (D.D.C. 977) (a freely negotiated
release between lawyers and clients, who were also lawyers, held not to be unethical because
there had been no malpractice by lawyer); Donnelly v. Ayer, 183 Cal. App. 3d 978, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 764 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (a release voluntarily and willingly signed by the client, who
received $1,000.00 cash and other consideration, in settlement of threatened malpractice
action did not violate DR 6-102).
149. Fla. Rules of Prof. Resp. 4-1.8(h).
150. The 1987 changes to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct present an interest-
ing and, indeed, ironic possibility with respect to innocent partners' liability for their part-
ners' malpractice. Under the new rule, a lawyer could conceivably !imit his own personal
liability, yet leave his innocent partners fully exposed to the client's claim for the negligent
partner's malpractice. Though unlikely, the absurdity of such a result points out the reason-
ableness of construing the Florida Act to provide limited liability.
151. 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674 (1983).
152. Zagoria v. Dubose Enter., 163 Ga. App. 880, 296 S.E.2d 353 (1982).
LIMITED LIABILITY
holder in a PSC, is liable "not only for his own professional mis-
deeds but also for those of the other members of the firm."'153
The court acknowledged that a corporation is a legal entity sepa-
rate from its shareholders, and that shareholders are generally in-
sulated from personal liability for corporate debts. The court ob-
served, however, that no clear legal authority had yet delineated
whether and to what extent limited liability applied to PSCs or-
ganized for the practice of law. Apparently influenced by the vari-
ous state supreme courts that had issued administrative rules gov-
erning legal PSCs,1 5 ' the Zagoria court concluded that it was not
only entitled but compelled to articulate special rules for liability
of attorneys:
We do not view this case as one in which we need to interpret
the statute providing for the creation and operation of profes-
sional corporations. We rather view this case as one which calls
for the exercise of this court's authority to regulate the practice of
law. This court has the authority and in fact the duty to regulate
the practice of law .... The legislature has the clear right to
enact technical rules for the creation and operation of profes-
sional corporations, but ... the influence of the statute upon the
professional corporation cannot extend to the regulation of the
law practice so as to impose a limitation of liability for acts of
malpractice or obligations incurred because of a breach of a duty
to a client. The professional nature of the law practice and its
obligations to the public interest require that each lawyer be
civilly responsible for his professional acts. A lawyer's relation-
ship to his client is a very special one. So also is the relationship
between a lawyer and the other members of his or her firm a spe-
cial one. When a client engages the services of a lawyer the client
has the right to expect the fidelity of other members of the firm.
It is inappropriate for the lawyer to be able to play hide-and-seek
in the shadows and folds of the corporate veil and thus escape the
responsibilities of professionalism.1 55
The Zagoria holding is actually not as broad as some of the per-
sonal liability rules adopted by other state supreme courts acting
in their administrative rulemaking capacity. 15 Unlike the Ohio Su-
153. Zagoria, 250 Ga. at 847, 302 S.E.2d at 676.
154. Id. at 845, 302 S.E.2d at 675 (citing Petition of Bar Ass'n, 55 Haw. 121, 516 P.2d
1267 (1973); In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 106 R.I. 752, 263 A.2d 692 (1970); In re Florida
Bar, 133 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961)).
155. Zagoria, 250 Ga. at 846, 302 S.E.2d at 675.
156. See supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
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preme Court, for example, the Zagoria court did not impose liabil-
ity on attorney shareholders for ordinary business debts. 57 Only
with respect to claims arising out of rendition of professional ser-
vices did the court "make no distinction between partnerships and
professional corporations."1 58
The Zagoria decision is remarkable not so much for the rule an-
nounced, but because of the circumstances under which the court
enunciated the rule. Before Zagoria, state supreme courts had defi-
nitely expanded the scope of attorney shareholders' personal liabil-
ity, but these courts had always done so by promulgating rules in
original proceedings and by construing those rules after they were
adopted.160 Therefore, in these states, the supreme court laid down
the law before any actual controversy arose and before attorneys
acted on the mistaken assumption that they were shielded from
personal liability. Zagoria demonstrates that, without notice, a
state supreme court could impose personal liability on attorney
shareholders after the fact.160
Furthermore, the significance of the Zagoria decision is in no
way diminished by the fact that the Georgia Professional Service
Corporation Act contains more ambiguous liability provisions than
does the Florida Act. 161 The Zagoria court made clear that it did
not consider the issue of attorneys' liability to be a matter of statu-
tory construction.162 Presumably, the court would have reached the
same conclusion regardless of the clarity and detail of the statutory
language. For these reasons, Zagoria is the most significant display
of judicial activism in this field.
Fortunately, the only Florida case to consider policy arguments
similar to those embraced by the Zagoria court suggests that Flor-
'ida courts are unlikely to rewrite or disregard the Florida Act's
clear provisions. Like the Sugerman decision, Corlett, Killian,
157. Zagoria, 250 Ga. at 846, 302 S.E.2d at 675.
158. Id. at 847, 302 S.E.2d at 676.
159. See, e.g., South High Dev., Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 1,
445 N.E.2d 1106 (1983).
160. See also Infosearch, Inc. v. Horowitz, 117 Misc. 2d 774, 459 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Civ. Ct.
1982); Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, 22 N.C. App. 544, 207 S.E.2d 267, rev'd on other
grounds, 286 N.C. 24, 209 S.E.2d 795 (1974).
161. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 14-7-7 (1982) with FLA. STAT. § 621.07 (1985).
162. Zagoria, 250 Ga. at 846, 302 S.E.2d at 675 ("We do not view this case as one in
which we need to interpret the statute providing for the creation and operation of profes-
sional corporations. We rather view this case as one which calls for the exercise of this
court's authority to regulate the practice of law."). In this respect, Zagoria differs signifi-
cantly from the cases cited supra in note 160.
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Hardeman, McIntosh and Levi v. Merritt,16 a involved a contro-
versy over the Act's provision governing free transferability of in-
terests of ownership.164 In Merritt, several minority shareholders of
a PSC engaged in the practice of law terminated their employment
with the PSC and sought redemption of their shares. Although
neither the articles of incorporation nor any separate shareholder
agreement required such redemption, the trial court ordered the
PSC to redeem the shares, relying generally on the Florida General
Corporation Act and the PSC Act.
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal concluded that
the Florida Statutes did not require redemption of shares in the
absence of an agreement or redemption provision in the corporate
documents. 6 ' The minority shareholders argued that the court was
nonetheless empowered to order redemption because of the "ex-
traordinary" situation presented by a PSC engaged in the practice
of law. The court rejected this argument and held that the PSC
was under no legal obligation to redeem the shares.
The court first observed that it was not at leisure to disregard
the corporate form of a PSC, even if the shareholders were attor-
neys, stating that "there is no occasion for treating this law firm as
a partnership. '"16 The court then expressly rejected any contention
that "ethical considerations unique to lawyers"16' should persuade
the court to "engraft judicially a redemption requirement upon
[the Act]."166 In rejecting these policy arguments, the court made
two crucial points.
First, the court stated that judicial intervention is an inappropri-
ate substitute for the individual shareholder's foresight and busi-
ness acumen. The court recognized that, absent a redemption re-
quirement, a professional who resigns from the PSC could be left
with unmarketable shares. This unfortunate possibility, however,
did not compel judicial intervention; rather, it presented a compel-
ling reason for the parties to enter into an advance agreement."6 '
163. 478 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
164. FLA. STAT. § 621.11 (1985).
165. Merritt, 478 So. 2d at 831.
166. Id. at 832.
167. Id. at 833.
168. Id. at 834.
169. Id. ("Where an employee who purchases such shares for valuable consideration ei-
ther lacks the foresight or the bargaining power to insist upon a redemption agreement in
the event of his resignation, it is not incumbent upon the courts to protect him from his own
improvidence or lack of strength.").
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Second, the court clearly distinguished between professional
conduct of attorneys which calls for disciplinary action and con-
duct that compels a court to decide an actual controversy on
grounds of public policy. The court reaffirmed that "while a law
firm practicing as a professional service corporation is governed by
corporate law, its lawyers are nonetheless governed by the ethical
standards contained in the Code of Professional Responsibility.'
7 0
However, the court made clear that simply because an attorney's
conduct may "justify action by the Florida Bar" did not mean that
the court should rewrite the statutory provisions governing
PSCs.17 1
Both of these points made in Merritt would be entirely persua-
sive in refuting any attempt to invoke similar policy considerations
in a case involving limited liability. Just as redemption can be pro-
vided for by advance agreement, so can any third party, including
a client, dealing with a PSC comprised of attorneys, insist upon
the shareholders' personal guarantee of the PSC's debts before en-
gaging the firm's services.1 72 Likewise, the fact that an attorney
may engage in unethical conduct does not justify abrogation of
Florida's clear limited liability provisions, especially where those
provisions protect only innocent shareholders, not "the unethical
or unfaithful" ones. Thus, the principles enunciated in Merritt are
readily applicable to the concept of limited liability. Indeed, be-
cause the Act is even more clear with respect to limited liability
than it is regarding redemption,17 3 these principles may apply with
even greater force in a case involving limited liability. Thus, when
confronted with policy arguments based upon the uniqueness of
the legal profession, Florida courts should reject Zagoria and, in-
stead, adhere to the judicial restraint demonstrated in Merritt.
170. Id. at 833.
171. Id. at 834.
172. See generally In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 1961); We're Assocs. v.
Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, P.C., 65 N.Y.2d 148, 153, 480 N.E.2d 357, 360, 490 N.Y.S.2d 743,
746 (1985); Paas, supra note 16, at 378 ("Creditors are aware that the best way to hold
shareholders liable for the business debts of a corporation is to require that the shareholders
act as guarantors. Matters do not change when the debtor is a professional corporation.").
173. The relative clarity of the Act's limited liability provisions is perhaps best demon-
strated by the Merritt decision itself, which devoted three pages of discussion to redemp-
tion, 478 So. 2d 828, 829-31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), but succinctly stated the parameters of
shareholders' liability in one footnote. Id. at 835 n.14.
LIMITED LIABILITY
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Even if a Florida court were persuaded by Zagoria, important
countervailing policy considerations exist which at least neutralize,
if not outweigh, the policy arguments embraced by the Zagoria
court. Before any conclusions can be reached about limited liabil-
ity for attorney shareholders of PSCs, the practicality of lawyers'
traditional "partnership" liability must be assessed in the context
of the modern legal profession. Judgments against partnerships
and innocent partners for the acts of individual partners may have
been appropriate in the past, when partnerships were generally
small, their composition relatively enduring, and their clients un-
likely to allege malpractice. Modern changes in lawyers, law firms
and the attitudes of clients, however, raise serious doubts as to the
propriety and fairness of insisting on unlimited liability of lawyers
for acts in which they took no part.
First, the increasing size of law firms makes it increasingly un-
realistic to expect lawyers to be personally accountable even for
the fraudulent acts of their partners. As discussed earlier, the size
of many of today's law firms makes it impossible for each partner
to be directly involved in all of the firm's managerial decisions, let
alone the wrongful acts of an individual partner. Indeed, partners
quite frequently do not even practice in the same city, or even the
same state as some of their partners. 17 4
Not only is the size of law firms increasing, but lawyers' mobility
is also on the rise. Mergers,1 75 acquisitions of branch offices, 176 firm
"reorganizations' 1 77 and "lateral entry"17 of partners are common
phenomena in today's legal world. While a firm should not be ex-
cused for negligent hiring, liability without fault seems incompati-
174. See generally Law Firm Branch Offices: A Selected Bibliography With Annota-
tions, 5 LECAL REF. SERV. Q. 83 (1985). Some lawyers even have partners in other countries.
See generally American Attorneys in London, 135 NEw L.J. 698 (1985).
175. 60 Percent of Midsize Firms Weigh Mergers, Manhattan Law, May 11, 1987, at 1,
col. 4 ("survey of all firms in Manhattan of 35-75 lawyers has revealed that 60 percent-31
of 51-have had serious merger talks . . . in the last six months").
176. See Steel Hector to absorb Botos & Oliver, MIAMI REVIEW, March 23, 1987, at 3
(Miami-based law firm of Steel, Hector & Davis establishes its third office in Palm Beach
County by acquiring the Boca Raton law firm of Botos & Oliver).
177. See Emmrick & Pollock, Retrenching at Rosenman, AMERICAN LAWYER, March
1987, at 79.
178. See, e.g., Playing The Numbers, MIAMI REViEW, June 19, 1987, at 1 (reporting lat-
eral hires by Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley & Casey). The National
Law Journal reports weekly in a regular column on the movement of lawyers from one firm
to another and from governmental service to private firms. See, e.g., Lateral Moves, Nat'l
L.J., March 16, 1987, at 2.
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ble with the rapid and sometimes dramatic personnel changes in
today's law firms.
Finally, the range of activities in which lawyers engage is contin-
ually broadening. The presence of practicing attorneys in the busi-
ness world is significant, and their role in complex deals and trans-
actions is difficult to define.1 79 This complexity makes it more
difficult for partners to know about, let alone control or direct, all
of the activities of their partners, and demonstrates the need for
limited liability in today's law firms.
For example, some of the partners in one of the nation's largest
law firms, Blank, Rome, Comiskey & McCauley,1 80 allegedly were
instrumental in the formation, management, and growth of Sunrise
Savings & Loan Association of Florida. Sunrise, once one of the
firm's largest clients, became insolvent, and the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) brought civil suit in
Florida against all of Blank, Rome's partners, individually and as
general partners.1 81
The FSLIC alleges that two Blank, Rome partners, Foxman and
Gitomer, were Chairmen of the Board of Sunrise and officers of
Sunrise's wholly-owned mortgage corporations. 82  Allegedly,
Foxman, Gitomer, and other Blank, Rome attorneys aided and
abetted Sunrise officers and directors by violating Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) regulations and breaching their fiduci-
ary duties to Sunrise shareholders; knowingly closing loans on
terms not authorized by the Sunrise Board Loan Committee, or
without proper documentation; and breaching their duties to their
client by representing both the borrower and Sunrise in the same
transactions and through numerous other conflicts of interest.183
The FSLIC seeks over $250 million in damages, disgorgement of all
legal fees paid to Blank, Rome by Sunrise, and an award of costs
and attorneys' fees.
179. See Sunrise, Sunset, PHILADELPHIA MAGAZINE, Nov. 1985, at 160 (describing in-
volvement of lawyers from Blank, Rome's Philadelphia office, with a Florida savings and
loan association).
180. A recent survey ranked Blank, Rome as the 89th largest firm in the United States.
See Nat'l L.J., Sept. 22, 1986, at 59.
181. FSLIC v. Jacoby (Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley), No. 86-1894 (S.D. Fla.
1986).
182. Id. Complaint 277.
183. Id. 60. For example, Foxmon allegedly was also a member of the Board of Direc-
tors of Crusader Savings & Loan Association of Pennsylvania and presented various transac-
tions to Sunrise on behalf of Crusader for Crusader's benefit. Id. 61.
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The Blank, Rome case underscores the potentially dramatic con-
sequences of unlimited liability in today's legal profession. Not
only are Blank, Rome partners from the firm's Philadelphia,
Miami, and West Palm Beach offices personally liable for acts, in
which many, if not most, played no part, but so too are partners
from the firm's New York and Washington offices, even though
these offices are not even mentioned in the substantive allegations
of the FSLIC's complaint. Lawsuits of such breadth and magni-
tude could devastate law firms of any size or stature, creating a
crisis for the firm's lawyers and clients alike. Incidentally, both the
West Palm Beach and Miami offices of Blank, Rome have closed
since Sunrise became insolvent.
Furthermore, a large judgment, like the one sought in the Blank,
Rome case, is an entirely realistic possibility. In fact, at least one
plaintiff has won a lawsuit of this type and magnitude in Florida.
Recently, in Tew v. Alexander Grant & Co.,'8 4 the trustee in bank-
ruptcy for E.S.M. Government Securities, Inc., sued a national ac-
counting firm and each of its partners in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida. The plaintiff alleged
negligence and breach of contract for failure of the accounting
firm's audits to disclose a coverup of losses by E.S.M., which re-
sulted in staggering losses to investors. The coverup was orches-
trated by Jose Gomez, the managing partner of the accounting
firm's Fort Lauderdale office, and by certain E.S.M. officers and
directors. The trustee alleged vicarious liability on the part of the
partnership and other individual partners, based on the acts of
Gomez.
At the trial, Judge Gonzalez instructed the jury on partnership
liability as follows:
A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on
a business for profit. A partnership is responsible for all damages
suffered by others as a result of the negligence or wrongful acts,
including fraud, of any of its partners. In addition, each partner is
responsible for all damages suffered by others as a result of the
negligence or wrongful acts of any of his or her partners regard-
less of whether he or she was involved with or participated in the
activities that caused the damage."'
184. 85-6219-Civ-Gonzalez (S.D. Fla. 1985).
185. Tew v. Alexander Grant & Co., Trial Transcript, Nov. 5, 1986, at 136.
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The jury returned a judgment against the partnership in the
amount of $70.9 million.186
The fact that Alexander Grant involved an accounting firm
rather than a law firm does not diminish the decision's impact on
the legal profession. The case points out the dangers of the part-
nership form given the dynamics of modern law firms. The case
also demonstrates the need to make limited liability available to
attorneys, for without limited liability, the risks of large firm prac-
tice are extraordinary. 187
Not only is the magnitude of suits against attorneys increasing,
but the number of suits against attorneys is also on the rise, partic-
ularly malpractice suits. This increase has affected lawyers in firms
of all sizes and has created a malpractice "insurance crisis" in the
legal community. Emphasizing that "[t]he insurance crisis is real,"
the President and President-Elect of the Florida Bar described the
problem in a recent letter to all Florida Bar members as follows:
"Florida lawyers are facing increasingly higher premiums for pro-
fessional liability insurance. Policies that are being written have
lower policy limits and higher deductible amounts. Some lawyers
have been unable to buy coverage at any price." '188
Left unchecked, this crisis can have a deleterious effect on the
quality and availability of legal services. Lawyers who are unable
to obtain malpractice insurance and wish to continue to practice
law are left few practical alternatives other than to be very selec-
tive about the cases they handle and the clients they serve. This
forced selectivity runs counter to "the objective of the Bar to make
legal services fully available."' 8 9 Even worse than the effect on pay-
186. See 18 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1690 (Nov. 21, 1986). Under a pretrial agreement ap-
proved by the court, Alexander Grant will have to pay only about half of this amount, or
$36 million. Id.
187. Admittedly, the social value of large firms, like most profitmaking institutions, is
open to debate. See generally Kagan & Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law
Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1985). The fact remains, however, that corporations'
growing demand for legal services has increased the importance of the expertise, organiza-
tional capacity, and resources large firms offer. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional
Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 503, 505 (1985).
188. Letter from Joseph J. Reiter, President, and Ray Ferrero, Jr., President-Elect, The
Florida Bar, to all Florida Bar Members, October 31, 1986.
189. EC 2-26, Article X, 1986 Integration Rule of Florida (repealed). Although the new
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar do not retain this precise Ethical Consideration, it should
not be assumed that the Florida Bar has rejected the worthy policy reflected in former EC
2-26. See Bammac, Inc. v. Grady, 500 So. 2d 274, 280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (referring to
another Code provision, the court stated: "That the exact language of these soon-to-be-
discarded 'ethical considerations' cannot be found in the comparatively arid passages of the
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ing clients, however, is the inevitable decrease in the number of
lawyers and businesses willing to provide legal services to indigent
clients. Indeed, expensive malpractice insurance is already a major
obstacle to pro bono work by corporations. 190
Although partnership liability is not the reason for the insurance
crisis, the overall problem is urgent enough to require action on all
available fronts. Permitting lawyers, like all other professionals
who practice in PSCs, to eliminate their liability for acts of mal-
practice in which they played no part, could reduce their exposure
to malpractice claims. This reduction is one small measure that
can be taken toward alleviating the insurance crisis. Because the
plain language of the Florida Act confers limited liability on all
professionals practicing in PSCs, Florida courts should seize the
opportunity to help remedy this crisis.
V. CONCLUSION
The Florida Act's limited liability provisions are unambiguous
and their plain meaning should control. Accordingly, while share-
holders are liable for their own professional misdeeds or those
committed by someone under their supervision, 91 no personal lia-
bility attaches to innocent shareholders. Furthermore, because
PSC shareholders' liability is no greater than that of a shareholder
in an ordinary business corporation, no personal liability for ordi-
nary business debts of the PSC exists.
Although courts outside Florida have, for reasons of public pol-
icy, developed special rules imposing personal liability on attor-
neys, such judicial activism is not justifiable in Florida. First, be-
cause Florida's limited liability provisions are so clear, a great deal
more "activism" on the part of Florida courts is required to reach
the same results as, for example, the courts in Ohio and Georgia
have reached. However, fundamentally, the reasoning of those
courts engaging in such activism is, for the most part, faulty. These
courts have ignored important policy considerations favoring lim-
ited liability for attorneys and have simply failed to articulate a
newly-adopted rules does not persuade us that they are no longer pertinent. Although
couched in different language, the spirit and purpose of the new rules remain the same.").
190. Danner, Businesses Lack Resources for Pro Bono Work, Legal Times, at 2, col. 2
(June 28, 1982) (citing expensive malpractice insurance as one obstacle to pro bono work by
corporations).
191. Interestingly, the recently adopted Rules Regulating the Florida Bar also place re-
sponsibility on supervising attorneys for ethical violations. Fla. Bar Rules of Prof. Resp.
4-5.1.
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compelling justification for treating lawyers differently than other
professionals. Absent such a compelling justification, Florida
courts should adhere to the clear legislatively prescribed limita-
tions on personal liability.
